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e Invisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk’s 
eory of Plastic Faculty
Hiro Hirai*
Centre for History of Science, Ghent University
“To know how the agent of generation acts, and the substance 
of this agent, is the noblest thing that man can know.”
– Moses of Narbonne
Abstract
In his embryological treatise De plastica seminis facultate (Strasburg, 1580), Jacob 
Schegk (1511-1587), professor of philosophy and medicine at the University of 
Tübingen, developed, through a unique interpretation of the Aristotelian embryology, 
a theory of the “plastic faculty” (facultas plastica), whose origin lay in the Galenic idea 
of the formative power. e present study analyses the precise nature of Schegk’s the-
ory, by setting it in its historical and intellectual context. It will also discuss the hith-
erto unappreciated Neoplatonic dimension of Schegk’s notion of the soul’s vehicle.
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1. Introduction
In the conclusion of his embryological work On the Formation of 
Foetus, Galen (129-ca. 216) admits to being ignorant of the cause 
which forms embryos. Although he recognizes the utmost wisdom 
and faculty in their formation, he does not believe that the soul in 
*) I gratefully acknowledge the help of S. Kusukawa, G. Giglioni, K. Jadoul and M. 
Iwata in the realisation of the present study. My warmest thanks also go to Caroline 
Leuris as well as Nobu and Nancy Siraisi.
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semen can construct them.1 Inspired by this argument, the human-
ist physician at Ferrara, Nicolò Leoniceno (1428-1524), wrote a 
small treatise entitled De virtute formativa (Venice, 1506) on the 
notion of “formative power” (virtus formativa), which physicians 
generally thought to be responsible for foetal formation.2 Indeed, 
this notion, whose original term was Galen’s “moulding faculty” 
(dunamis diaplastike), was in vogue during the Middle Ages as an 
explanation for the formation not only of the foetus but also of nat-
ural things in general. In his treatise, Leoniceno criticised the inter-
pretation of Averroes (1126-1198) and Pietro d’Abano (1257-ca. 
1315), basing himself on ancient Greek commentators of Aristotle 
like Simplicius, whose texts were newly made available in Leonice-
no’s time. It can be said that his discussion, with its philological 
orientation, opened up a new era of Renaissance embryology. Against 
Leoniceno’s naturalist understanding of the formative power, the 
French physician Jean Fernel (1497-1558) developed a fully Plato-
nising theory of “divine formative power” for foetal formation in 
his very inﬂuential work, De abditis rerum causis (Paris, 1548).3 Fol-
lowing Fernel, Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558), in his extremely 
popular treatise Exotericae exercitationes (Lyon, 1557) spoke of a 
“divine force,” which formed embryos.4
1) Galen, De formatione fœtuum, 6 (Karl G. Kühn, Galeni opera omnia (Leipzig, 1821-
1833), IV, 700 = Diethard Nickel, Galen: Über die Ausformung der Keimlinge (Berlin, 
2001), 104).
2) See Vivian Nutton, “e Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine,” in 
Gordon R. Dunstan, ed., e Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European 
Traditions (Exeter, 1990), 136-157, esp. 138-140 and 152-153; Hiro Hirai, “Semence, 
vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicolò Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-
latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs,” Early Science and Medicine, 12 
(2007), 134-165.
3) See my “Alter Galenus: Jean Fernel et son interprétation platonico-chrétienne de 
Galien,” Early Science and Medicine, 10 (2005), 1-35.
4) Scaliger, Exotericae exercitationes, ex. 6.5 (Lyon, 1557), 14r. Cf. Guido Giglioni, 
“Girolamo Cardano e Giulio Cesare Scaligero: il dibattito sul ruolo dell’anima vege-
tativa,” in Marialuisa Baldi and Guido Canziani, eds., Girolamo Cardano: le opere, le 
fonti, la vita (Milan, 1999), 313-339, esp. 319.
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is is the intellectual context of the theory of Jacob Degen alias 
Schegk (1511-1587).5 A native of Schorndorf near Stuttgart in Würt-
temberg, an accomplished humanist and a moderate Lutheran, he 
taught philosophy and medicine at the Protestant university of 
Tübingen for several decades. Although he still remains fairly 
unknown to historians today, it should be noted that his university 
lectures were very popular and attracted many students, often from 
reformed lands. Even though Schegk is mainly remembered as a 
commentator of Aristotle, he was also keenly interested in medical 
and biological ﬁelds. He composed, among other things, an embry-
ological treatise entitled De plastica seminis facultate (Strasburg, 1580). 
is seems to be the ﬁrst Renaissance work that applied to the 
Galenic notion of formative power the term “plastic”, which resulted 
in the expression of “plastic faculty” (facultas plastica).6 
Although this work is now relatively scarce, Schegk’s theory seems 
to have been known widely among Protestant natural philosophers 
such as Daniel Sennert (1572-1637) and Johann Amos Comenius 
(1592-1670) at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.7 
William Harvey (1578-1678) drew on this theory for his idea of 
“plastic force” (vis plastica) as the organising agent of embryos in 
5) See Dictionary of Scientiﬁc Biography, 12 (1975), 150-151; Christoph Sigwart, 
“Jakob Schegk, Professor der Philosophie und Medizin,” in Kleine Schriften (Freiburg 
im Breisgau, 1889), 256-291; Charles H. Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. 
Renaissance Authors (Florence, 1988), 410-412; Sachiko Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses 
of Aristotle: A Comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon,” in Con-
stance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, eds., Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle (Aldershot, 1999), 169-188. On the 
natural philosophy at Tübingen in the sixteenth century, see among others Charlotte 
Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen: Stimulus to a eological Mathematics (Aldershot, 
1998).
6) I have used the following edition: Jacob Schegk, De plastica seminis facultate libri 
tres (Strasburg: Bernhard Jobin, 1580), indicated hereafter as PSF. On this, see  Walter 
Pagel, New Light on William Harvey (Basel, 1976), 100-103.
7) Daniel Sennert, De chymicorum cum Aristotelicis et Galenicis consensu et dissensu 
(Wittenberg, 1619), cap. ix. I have used its third edition (Paris, 1633), here, 95-97. 
On Comenius, see Guido Giglioni, “Spiritus Plasticus between Pneumatology and 
Embryology (A Note about Comenius’ Concept of Spirit),” Studia comeniana et his-
torica 24 (1994), 83-90.
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his epigenesist system. Moreover, it is not only in embryology but 
also in natural philosophy in general that the notion of plastic power 
came to play an important role during the seventeenth century. 
Applying it even to the formation of some minerals and fossils, the 
Jesuit father Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680) provoked lively debates 
in the republic of letters.8 More importantly, the Cambridge Pla-
tonists, Henry More (1614-1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), 
transformed this embryological idea into their own, famous doc-
trine of “plastic nature.” Aimed at explaining the whole organisa-
tion of the created world itself rather than the simple generation 
of natural beings, it held signiﬁcant metaphysical and theological 
implications. at is why G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) was very inter-
ested in this doctrine. us a single medical theory of Renaissance 
humanism ultimately contributed to important philosophical debates 
of the “Scientiﬁc Revolution.” 
In order to be able to evaluate properly the various aspects of 
later developments, it is necessary to understand ﬁrst the exact nature 
of this Renaissance theory in detail. As we shall see, Schegk’s for-
mulation already contains the seed of its subsequent transforma-
tion. His treatise On the Plastic Faculty of Seed is divided into three 
books, the ﬁrst of which deals with the general theory of this fac-
ulty, the second with its workings in foetal formation and the third 
with the intellect. e object of the present study is to analyse 
Schegk’s notion of the plastic faculty, putting it back in its own his-
torical and intellectual context, and to understand precisely the prem-
ises of a concept which later developed into the theory of “plastic 
nature” at the heart of the “Scientiﬁc Revolution.”
2. e Plastic Faculty as the Instrument of God
Schegk opens his discussion by declaring that, among the admira-
ble forces and faculties of natural things, the “formative and plas-
8) Hiro Hirai, “Interprétation chymique de la création et origine corpusculaire de la 
vie chez Athanasius Kircher,” Annals of Science 64 (2007), 217-234. Cf. also William 
B. Hunter Jr, “e Seventeenth Century Doctrine of Plastic Nature,” Harvard eo-
logical Review, 43 (1950), 197-213.
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tic faculty” (facultas formatrix et plastica) is the most remarkable 
one. For, it fashions from the raw and formless matter of seed an 
animate body with its parts well formed in terms of quality, ﬁgure, 
number, position, relationship, etc. For Schegk, it is as if all of these 
parts were made by divine providence and the wisest intellect. By 
this appeal to transcendent entities, Schegk is alluding to Galen’s 
discussion in the last book of his treatise On the Usefulness of the 
Parts of the Body, which is in a sense a hymn to the Creator.9 “If 
this plastic force,” says Schegk, “is not God himself, who will doubt 
that it must all the same be called the hand of almighty God?” By 
continuously generating perishable things with this faculty, God skil-
fully preserves the perpetuity of the species. is direct comparison 
of the formative power with the Creator is a further reference to 
Galen’s famous phrase: “I do not know whether this power is the 
Creator or not.” In the scholastic tradition, this phrase was well 
known through Averroes’ quotation of it in his Long Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, VII.10 According to Schegk, if the works 
of Nature and the plastic faculty as the invisible hand of God are 
contemplated correctly, no one will doubt that God is the wisest 
being of all. For Schegk, the ultimate goal of the works of Nature 
is the beauty, for which all movements and generations are destined. 
God is, he adds, the most excellent being above of all beautiful and 
good things He created with his natural instrument, that is, the 
plastic faculty. Schegk concludes that the wisdom of this divine Arti-
9) Galen, De usu partium, XVII (Kühn, IV, 346-366 = Charles Daremberg, Œuvres 
anatomiques, physiologiques et médicales de Galien (Paris, 1854-1856), II, 201-211 = 
Margaret T. May, Galen: On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (Ithaca, 1968), 724-
733). Cf. Paul Moraux, “Galien comme philosophe: la philosophie de la nature,” in 
Vivian Nutton, ed., Galen: Problems and Prospects (London, 1981), 87-116; Hirai, 
“Alter Galenus,” 8-11.
10) Cf. Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, IX.8 (Kühn, V, 789 = Phillip De Lacy, 
Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (Berlin, 1980), 597); Averroes, Long 
Commentary on Metaphysics, VII.31 (ed. Giunta, Venice, 1552, VIII, 181 F = Mau-
rice Bouyges, Averroès: Tafsîr mâ ba’d at-tabî’at (Beirut, 1938-1948), 884 = Ahmed 
Elsakhawi, Étude du livre Zây (Dzêta) de la Métaphysique d’Aristote dans sa version 
arabe et son commentaire par Averroès (Lille, 1994), 117). See now Hirai, “Semence, 
vertu formatrice,” p. 159.
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ﬁcer controls his hands so that the logos is observed not only in his 
mind but also in his hands.
Schegk then goes on to posit two kinds of eﬃcient cause in the 
natural world. One is “irrational and material” (alogon kai ulikon). 
e qualities of the traditional four elements like hot and cold, 
which “change” something, belong to this category. e other group 
comprises the form and “reason-principle” (logos), which “generate” 
something. is includes the “spermatic logos” (logos spermatikos) or 
“enmattered logos” (logos en hule).11 Schegk also qualiﬁes further 
the spermatic logos as “plastic” (plastikos), that is, formative. is 
logos is the eﬃcient cause of the generation of animate beings like 
plants and animals and cannot belong to the matter from which 
these beings are generated.
To explain the spermatic logos, Schegk ﬁrst takes up the problem 
of the term “sperm” (sperma). According to him, Galen applied it 
on the one hand to seminal liquid in his commentary on Hip-
pocrates’ Prognostic and on the other hand to a dunamis or logos in 
the manner of Aristotle, who did not consider the sperm as mate-
rial cause but as eﬃcient cause of the foetus.12 Schegk points out, 
however, that Galen used “sperm” in general to designate seminal 
moisture or matter, saying that the foetus was generated from sperm 
and blood. at is why he opposed Aristotle in his treatise On 
Semen.13 But, for Schegk who closely follows Aristotle’s deﬁnition, 
sperm does not signify a visible genital or material moisture at all, 
11) PSF, I, sig. A1v: “Eﬃcientium proinde causarum in natura duplex est genus, unum 
est ἄλογον καὶ ὑλικόν, ut si frigore aut calore alteratur quidpiam, alterum est, quod 
ut forma et logos generat quidpiam: ut σπερματικός λόγος, aut alias ἐν ὕλη λόγος, 
ut si simile generat simile sibi, aut si nutritum assimilat sibi nutrimentum.” Elswhere 
Schegk prefers to use the term λόγος ἔνυλος, which Aristotle used only once. Cf. Jules 
Tricot, Aristote: De l’âme (Paris, 1934), 10 n. 2, on Aristotle, On the Soul, I.1, 403a25; 
Robert B. Todd, emistius: On Aristotle, On the Soul (London, 1996), 157 n. 46; 
James O. Urmson and Peter Lautner, Simplicius: On Aristotle’s On the Soul 1.1-2.4 
(Ithaca, 1995), 164 n. 91.
12) Galen, In Hippocratis Prognosticon, I, 42 (Kühn, XVIII-B, 106). Here Galen speaks 
of θοπώδη.
13) On De semine, see Phillip De Lacy, Galen: On Semen (Berlin, 1998); Michael Boy-
lan, “Galen’s Conception eory,” Journal of the History of Biology, 19 (1986), 47-77; 
Paolo Accattino, “Galeno e la riproduzione animale: analisi del De semine,” in Wolf-
book_ESM12-4.indb   382 21-9-2007   9:49:45
 H. Hirai / Early Science and Medicine 12 (2007) 377-404 383
but must be a certain dunamis or logos. us he concludes that sperm 
is a synonym for the spermatic and plastic logos.14
Schegk further divides the eﬃcient cause into 1) principal and 
2) instrumental. For him, the plastic logos is the instrumental cause 
whose principal cause is either the parent, who emits seed, or heaven, 
on which depend all the generations and corruptions of natural 
things. Schegk goes on to ask whether the plastic logos is animate 
or inanimate. According to him, if this logos is inanimate, it can-
not produce an animate body which is nobler than itself, whereas 
if it is animate it cannot be the instrument, that is, the dunamis 
of an animate body, because what is animate is not a dunamis but 
a body. He says:
us it should be concluded that sperm is not an animate or inanimate body, but 
that it is an instrument for the generation of an animate body. e animate body 
uses it as a certain instrument for generation […]. Indeed, since sperm is not a 
body but a logos and a certain dunamis, it follows then that sperm is not an ani-
mate or inanimate body, just as the soul itself is not something animate or inan-
imate but something non-animate, because it is a logos and a certain entelecheia of 
an organic body.15
Schegk then aﬃrms that the instrument is a “productive potential-
ity/faculty” (dunamis poietike). e sperm, which is understood as 
the instrumental cause of the principal agent, is a dunamis and dif-
fers from what is in actuality, although no dunamis can be deﬁned 
without any actuality. For Schegk, something productive cannot 
gang Haase, ed., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: II, Principat (Berlin, 
1994), XXXVII.2, 1856-1886.
14) See Anthony Preus, “Science and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals,” 
Journal of the History of Biology, 3 (1970), 1-52; Gérard Verbeke, “Doctrine du 
pneuma et entéléchisme chez Aristote,” in G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen, eds., Ari-
stotle on Mind and the Senses (Cambridge, 1975), 191-214, esp. 193-194.
15) PSF, I, sig. A2r: “Ex quo concludendum sperma nec animatum, nec inanimatum 
esse corpus, sed instrumentum generationis animati corporis, quo ad gignendum uta-
tur animatum corpus, tanquam instrumento quodam […]. Cum enim sperma cor-
pus non sit, sed λόγος et δύναμις quaedam, sequitur, ut sperma nec animatum, nec 
inanimatum sit corpus, ut nec anima ipsa est animatum, aut inanimatum quiddam, 
sed quiddam non animatum quum sit λόγος et ἐντελέχεια quaedam corporis 
organici.”
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belong to matter, but must belong to logos. en he explains what 
this spermatic logos really is. First of all, he does not want to mean 
by the term logos anything relative to the intellect separated from 
matter, but only the substantial form which resides in natural things. 
In this connection, he even argues that, at the end of On the For-
mation of Foetus, Galen admitted to being ignorant of the identity 
of the soul or the plastic dunamis, asking whether it is corporeal 
or incorporeal and whether it is a logos or something irrational.16 
Schegk takes pains to address this doubt and explain what the soul 
is. For him, it is the substance or entelecheia of a natural organic 
body. Although it is not corporeal or divisible, it is the principal 
cause of the aﬀections of this animate body. As an incorporeal prin-
ciple, it resides in the whole body and in every part of it. e soul 
is the logos, which “informs” the parts of its matter by the same 
number of natures as there are these parts. It connects the homoeo-
merous and non-homoeomerous parts of the body and organises 
and animates them. Using these organised parts as its organs, the 
soul obtains powers to perform its actions.17 
Next Schegk tackles the problem of the term “irrational” (alogon), 
which occurred in Galen’s phrase. For him, if the Greek physician 
had truly learned from Aristotle the homonymy of the term logos, 
he would never have wrongly attributed irrationality to natural forms, 
but would rightly have recognised the forms, which are rational yet 
devoid of intelligence, as the principles of the actions and passions 
16) PSF, I, sig. A3r. Scheck interpolates the part “or the plastic dunamis.” Cf. Galen, 
De formatione fœtuum, 6 (Kühn, IV, 700 = Nickel, 104): “[…] I cannot allow that the 
soul in semen […] forms foetus, since this kind of soul is not only not intelligent but 
entirely irrational.” Cf. Moraux, “Galien comme philosophe,” 114-116; Hirai, “Alter 
Galenus,” 6-7; id., “Semence, vertu formatrice,” §2. On homoeomerous and non-
homoeomerous parts, see Aristotle, Meteorology, IV.10, 388a10-12, 390b22; Véroni-
que Boudon, Galien: Exhortation à l’étude de la médecine, Art médical (Paris, 2000), 
401-402.
17) PSF, I, sig. A3v-A4r. I translate the term informare as “to inform” keeping the sense 
of “to animate.” Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, II.1, 412a30-35: “is is why the soul is 
an actuality of the ﬁrst kind of a natural body having life potentially in it; the body 
so described is a body which is organised.” For a recent revision of the traditional 
interpretation of this phrase, see A. P. Bos, e Soul and Its Instrumental Body: A 
Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature (Leiden, 2003).
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of natural things. According to Schegk, having puzzled over how 
the logos could be devoid of intelligence, Galen ended up denying 
the existence of this kind of logos, even though Aristotle had allowed 
for it. In Schegk’s eyes, the Greek physician had ignored the diﬀer-
ence between the enmattered logos and the intellectual logos. e 
former, which informs matter, must be said to be devoid of intel-
ligence and only potentially intellectual:
But Galen denies that the form in matter is a logos, that is, a divine and immuta-
ble principle which determines all the natural actions and passions of a thing, so 
that natural things cannot be found better or more perfectly, and that this form 
is something divine, beautiful, good and desirable in comparison with the mat-
ter, to the extent that deformity comes to matter because of its privation.18
Also in the following, Schegk continues to criticise Galen’s incon-
sistency: the Greek physician had on the one hand described the 
nature of seed as something irrational in his On the Formation of 
Foetus, but admired on the other hand the perfect logos and the 
divine providence of the Creator in the works of Nature in his On 
the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body. For Schegk, in Nature, there 
must be non-intellectual logoi. Schegk’s Nature is thus “rational”, 
although Nature is not a divine intellect itself. For, it is not neces-
sary for a natural logos to be identical with an intelligence or some-
thing endowed with intelligence, even if, like Nature, it does 
nothing in vain. Schegk adds that the works of Nature diﬀer from 
the products of art, because the logos of art is an “external” eﬃcient 
principle, while the natural logos is an “internal” eﬃcient principle. 
For him, this internal principle for the formation of natural things 
is created by God and resides in these natural things themselves. 
e natural logoi produce for the sake of deﬁnite ends because these 
logoi, created by God, imitate the Creator as if they were the hands 
and instruments of this wisest Artiﬁcer.19
18) PSF, I, sig. A5v: “At vero Galenus formam in materia negat esse λόγον, nempe 
principium divinum et immutabile determinans omnes actiones et passiones rei natu-
rales, ut melius et perfectius habere se nequeant res naturales, et quae forma, respectu 
materiae sit quiddam θεῖον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν, ἐφετόν, quoad deformitas scilicet mate-
riae propter privationem accidat.”
19) PSF, I, sig. A6r-A6v. It is in connection with this instrumentalism that Pagel has 
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Schegk concludes his discussion by saying that the plastic fac-
ulty, just like the powers of the soul, is not irrational but a natu-
ral logos. Although it is devoid of intelligence, it does not produce 
its eﬀects by chance but for the sake of deﬁnite ends, just as Nature 
does nothing in vain. en Schegk asks himself: “By gazing at the 
wonderful works of Nature, who will doubt the wisdom and power 
of the Creator whose force and potency are diﬀused everywhere by 
this instrument?” us, although it is not endowed with intelligence, 
the plastic logos is a rational instrument created by God for the gen-
eration of animate bodies.
3. e Nature of the Plastic Faculty
Schegk now turns to the problem of the nature of the plastic fac-
ulty, namely its identity and the way of its operation. As we have 
seen, he thinks that the plastic faculty is endowed with reason to 
form the body of animate beings in the manner of God’s hands, 
although it is itself devoid of intelligence. By dividing the eﬃcient 
cause into two categories (principal and instrumental), Schegk clas-
siﬁes sperm as a logos or dunamis among the instrumental causes. 
Since an imperfect being cannot produce anything superior to itself, 
the sperm alone, which is not animate, cannot produce an animate 
body. us a principal cause is required.
Schegk ﬁrst explains the double aspect of the instrumental cause. 
For him, when sperm is in the spermatic vessels of the parent, it 
remains in potentiality, whereas when it starts to form the foetus, 
it exists in actuality. By the same token, when a vegetable seed does 
not perform any action, it remains in potentiality, but when it 
becomes fertile in earth, it exists in actuality. Schegk adds, how-
ever, that heaven intervenes eﬃciently in all generations, as Aristo-
tle aﬃrms in his Physics, II.2: “Man is begotten by man and by the 
sun as well.”20
observed the similarity between Schegk and Albertus Magnus. On the latter’s theory, 
Adam Takahashi is preparing a detailed study in his article “Nature, Formative Power 
and Intellect in the Natural Philosophy of Albertus Magnus,” forthcoming.
20) PSF, I, sig. A7r. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II.2, 194b14. 
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After having described this double (actual and potential) aspect 
of the instrumental cause, Schegk quotes another passage of Aris-
totle’s On the Generation of Animals (hereafter GA), II.1: “For art 
is both the source and form of the product, but it only exists else-
where than the product, whereas the movement of Nature exists in 
the product itself, issuing from another being which has the form 
in actuality.”21 As we have seen above, for Schegk, the principle of 
movement, which resides in the instrument of the artisan, remains 
outside of the product, whereas the plastic faculty, which forms the 
body of natural things, is internal. He goes on to aﬃrm that the 
plastic logos resides in its subject, not as a form that establishes a 
hylomorphic composite with matter, but as a certain “actuality” (ener-
geia), which executes its work. From here on, the plastic faculty, 
which has so far been conceived as a kind of productive dunamis, 
will be explained in terms of energeia.
For Schegk, a principal agent possesses its “species” (eidos) or 
essence in actuality, whereas an instrument does not possess the spe-
cies of the agent but only the energeia of the species. e species 
is not identical with the energeia of the species. To explain this point, 
Schegk takes recourse to the example of vision. e species of a vis-
ible thing resides in its body and stimulates the observer’s vision 
through its energeia, which plays the role of instrument. It is not 
the species of colour or ﬁgure but only the energeia of this species 
that is dispersed from the body. It is precisely here that Schegk intro-
duces his idea of the “secondary actuality” (actus secundus). For him, 
the secondary actuality is the energeia of the species, inserted into 
the instrument and inseparable from the ﬁrst actuality. Neverthe-
less, he goes on to say that the seminal secondary actuality is excep-
tionally separable from the ﬁrst actuality, just as the inseparable 
species of the vision are separated by the power of phantasia.22 us 
its working is analogous to that of imaginatio. Schegk adds that not 
the corporeal parts of an animal, which is to come, but only its 
21) Aristotle, GA, II.1, 735a2-4.
22) On phantasia and imaginatio, see Marta Fattori and Massimo L. Bianchi, eds., 
Phantasia-imaginatio (Rome, 1988); Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 7 (1989), 
cols. 516-535; Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, Umbra naturae: l’immaginazione da Ficino a 
Bruno (Rome, 2000).
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“productive actuality” (energeia poietike) is contained in the seed. 
By this special actuality, an animate body can generate another being 
of the same kind through the seed as its instrument. According to 
Schegk, the plastic logos is therefore this productive secondary actu-
ality which resides in an instrumental body. He notes, however, that 
heaven can generate animate beings without the parent of the same 
kind. is is the phenomenon called “spontaneous generation.” It 
is because, without the parent of the same kind, heaven stimulates 
in a body composed of elements a weak plastic actuality which can 
form inferior animate beings.23
en Schegk posits another question: “Is the seminal secondary 
actuality accidental?” If this actuality is accidental, it cannot gene-
rate a substance. But since it fashions animate bodies, it must be 
substantial. As the ﬁrst actuality produces by means of the secondary 
actuality, man generates man through the secondary actuality, which 
is the spermatic logos. It should be noted here that one of the most 
extraordinary characters of the plastic faculty in Schegk is its capa-
city to produce a substance from what is not substantial. He con-
cludes thus that sperm is an instrumental cause as well as the 
plastic and formative logos, though not enmattered. It is something 
intermediate between what is animate and what is to be animated. 
is logos as the secondary actuality, which fashions animate bodies, 
is the psychic and substantial principle, because it produces a sub-
stance, that is, the soul.24
23) PSF, I, sig. A7r-A7v. On spontaneous generation in the Renaissance, see my 
“Earth’s Soul and Spontaneous Generation: Fortunio Liceti’s Criticism against Fici-
no’s Ideas on the Origin of Life,” in Stephen Clucas et al., eds., Laus Platonici Philoso-
phi: Marsilio Ficino and His Inﬂuence (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). Cf. also its French 
version, “Âme de la terre, génération spontanée et origine de la vie: Fortunio Liceti cri-
tique de Marsile Ficin,” Bruniana & Campanelliana, 12 (2006), 451-469.
24) PSF, I, sig. B2r: “Demonstratum hactenus opinior quod videlicet sperma sit instru-
mentalis causa et λόγος quiddam ποιητικός seu πλαστικός sed non ἔνυλος, eﬃciens 
seu generans corpus animatum, et non etiam ipsum animatum existens, medium, 
inter animatum, et animandum interpositum, sine informatione alicujus materiae ad 
eﬃciendum eﬃcax, ut actus, et energeia quaedam secunda.” 
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4. Is the Plastic logos Corporeal or Incorporeal?
Schegk then discusses whether the plastic logos is immaterial (aulos) 
and whether it is incorporeal, or a certain “incorporeal species” (eidos 
asomatikon) producing the soul in an organic body. For him, it is 
evident, however, that this logos is not incorporeal because its eﬃci-
ent cause is an animate body, the parent. Otherwise, this logos would 
be an intelligence or an intellectual logos, whose cause can never be 
identiﬁed with a body. According to Schegk, intelligence, like the 
prime mover of the celestial spheres, is an incorporeal being in Ari-
stotle. By contrast, the soul of heaven is corporeal although it is not 
material, because the body of heaven has no substantial matter, as 
Averroes teaches.25 e celestial soul is corporeal, not because it 
animates its body (as the soul of perishable things does), but because 
this soul, inseparably tied to its body, turns by itself with an eter-
nal motion. To those who ask whether the plastic logos is a body 
or something corporeal, Schegk answers that this logos is not sepa-
rable from the body, because the plastic dunamis is always tied to 
a certain body. He adds that intellect and intelligence are separa-
ted not only from the material body but also from such a non-mate-
rial body as that of heaven.26 We may thus suppose that, for him, 
intellect and intelligence are totally separated from corporeity while 
the plastic logos, like the soul of heaven, is corporeal and insepa-
rable from the body, although it is immaterial. Schegk aﬃrms else-
where that the plastic logos of each part of the body contains in it 
immaterial species and can make them enmattered.27 us it should 
be understood that the plastic logos, which contains the immaterial 
species, is immaterial in itself but can be seen as enmattered by the 
fact that it produces enmattered species in matter. 
25) Averroes, De substantia orbis, 1 (Arthur Hymann, “Averroès: A Treatise concern-
ing the Substance of the Celestial Sphere,” in Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, eds., 
Philosophy the Middle Ages: e Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions (Indianapolis, 
1973), 307-314, esp. 311); Helen Tunik Goldstein, Averroes’ Questions in Physics (Dor-
drecht, 1991), 34.
26) PSF, I, sig. B2r-B2v.
27) PSF, II, sig. C1r.
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But there is some ambiguity in Schegk’s discussion. For he says 
on the one hand that the plastic logos is corporeal, but on the other 
hand that this logos is not totally incorporeal. In reality, Schegk 
regards the plastic logos as not completely incorporeal, unlike an 
intellectual logos, because it is endowed with “divine body” (corpus 
divinum) and can generate other animate bodies. It is without doubt 
because of the relationship with this “divine body” that Schegk 
thinks that the plastic logos is corporeal. In another passage, where 
he underlines the diﬀerence between the incorporeal logos and the 
corporeal logos, he distinguishes the intellectual logos from the natu-
ral logos which produces form in a natural body. us this natural 
logos must be understood as corporeal. Schegk also asks why the 
divine intellect cannot give natural logoi to the seeds of living beings 
just as intellectual logoi are given to man. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that the plastic logoi are these natural logoi conferred to the 
seeds.
5. e Divine Vehicle of the Plastic Faculty
After this radical re-interpretation of Aristotelian embryology, the 
discussion takes an unexpected turn, developing into a Neoplato-
nic dimension. As we have seen, Schegk speaks of a certain “divine 
body” to which the plastic logos is inseparably tied. Aﬃrming that 
Aristotle compares the plastic logos with an art that produces nothing 
without a corporeal instrument, he proposes to seek what this instru-
mental body really is, by which the plastic logos performs its power. 
is is how his answer begins:
e Stoics say that a certain ethereal and divine body is the vehicle of the soul 
itself. Such is also the body of the plastic faculty. e author of the ﬁrst book On 
Regimen in [the corpus of ] Hippocrates (Galen denies, however, that this is of 
Hippocrates) calls it “the creative ﬁre” which advances on its path towards gene-
ration, as Zeno, according to Cicero, deﬁnes it.28
28) PSF, I, sig. B2v: “Stoici dicunt, quoddam αἰθερῶδες esse σῶμα divinum, ὄχημα 
quoddam ipsius existens animae, quale sit etiam corpus plasticae facultatis, quem 
autor libri primi De diaeta apud Hippocratem (nam Hippocratis, negat esse Galenus) 
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Schegk thereupon introduces the Stoic idea of causa continens, which 
he had already discussed in the introduction to his translation of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (ﬂ. ca. 200 AC) work De mixtione.29 On 
the details of his discussion, where he identiﬁes this cause with God 
himself who penetrates all, he refers the reader back to this intro-
duction. As for the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen, also called De 
victus ratione, its author posits a ﬁre which “structures the human 
body by imitating the universe.”30 is idea can be interpreted as 
being very close to the Stoic notion of the divine creative ﬁre.31 
at is why Schegk places the Stoics at the head of this passage. It 
should, however, be noted that it is not the author of this Hippo-
cratic treatise who speaks of “a creative ﬁre which advances on its 
path towards generation,” since this is a phrase of Cicero who attri-
butes it to Zeno. e Tübingen professor is in his turn merely copy-
ing it here.32
Schegk goes on without delay to say that Aristotle calls the ethe-
real body “what corresponds by analogy to the ﬁfth element.” is 
is of course that famous enigmatic phrase in GA, II.3, which esta-
blishes a close connexion between animal generation and the cele-
stial element, the aether.33 As we have shown in previous studies, 
ignem artiﬁciosum appellat ad gignendum progredientem via, ut ipsum deﬁnit Zeno 
apud Ciceronem.”
29) On De mixtione, see Robert B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A 
Study of the De mixtione (Leiden, 1976). On his Latin translation (Tübingen, 1540), 
see F. Edward Cranz, “Alexander Aphrodisiensis,” Catalogus translationum et commen-
tariorum, 1 (1960), 77-135, esp. 113.
30) Hippocrates, On Regimen, I.10 (Littré, 484 = Robert Joly and Simon Byl, Hip-
pocrate: Du régime (Berlin, 2003), 134). Cf. Robert Joly, Recherches sur le traité pseudo-
hippocratique Du régime (Paris, 1960), 35-36. On the importance of this treatise in 
the Renaissance, see my “Prisca eologia and Neoplatonic Reading of Hippocrates in 
Fernel, Cardano and Gemma,” in Hiro Hirai, ed., Cornelius Gemma (1535-1578): 
Medicine, Cosmology, and Natural Philosophy in Renaissance Louvain (Rome, forthcom-
ing).
31) See Friedrich Solmsen, “Cleanthes or Posidonius? e Basis of Stoic Physics,” Med-
edelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 24 (1961), 263-
289; David Hahm, e Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus, 1977); Martin Vanden 
Bruwaene, Cicéron: De natura deorum (Brussels, 1978), II, 48 n. 73.
32) Cicero, De natura deorum, II.22, 57 (Vanden Bruwaene, 81).
33) Aristotle, GA, II.3, 736b33-737a7. Cf. Friedrich Solmsen, “e Vital Heat, the 
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while Leoniceno vigorously refused to appeal to this passage to 
explain the true nature of the formative power, Fernel responded 
to it very favourably. In fact, for Fernel, this passage constituted the 
very foundation of his fully Platonising interpretation of Galen and 
Aristotle.34 As for Schegk, he aﬃrms that this body is not identi-
cal at all to the ﬁfth element in these terms:
is body diﬀers from the celestial element because it evidently has no nature 
separable from its matter or from seminal liquid. Because of this, Aristotle says 
that it is not celestial but similar by analogy to the celestial [element], or “analo-
gous to the higher element.” is body is penetrating through the entire matter, 
forming and ﬁguring it, and distinguishes it by the natures of its parts […]. 
Indeed, this body is totally spiritual and the most kindred to the substance of the 
plastic logos. It is established that this [logos] is a certain energeia of the ﬁrst actua-
lity and, so to speak, the secondary yet substantial actuality of another animate 
and physical body although it is evidently itself not a physical body. For, other-
wise, a physical body cannot enter and penetrate its matter, because there is no 
[mutual] penetration of physical bodies.35
Although Leoniceno had previously advanced this kind of “simila-
rity (and non-identity)” of the “divine body” with the aether, we 
cannot determine whether Schegk had any direct or indirect know-
ledge of the embryological treatise of the Ferrarese humanist. At any 
event, concerning this ethereal body, Leoniceno relied upon a phrase 
by emistius (ca. 317-ca. 388), which connected the Aristotelian 
Inborn Pneuma and the Aether,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, 77 (1957), 119-123; 
David M. Balme, Aristotle’s De partibus animalium I and De generatione animalium 
I (Oxford, 1972), 161-164; Gad Freudenthal, Aristotle’s eory of Material Substance: 
Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul (Oxford, 1995), 107-114.
34) See Hirai, “Alter Galenus,” 24-28; id., “Semence, vertu formatrice,” §3.
35) PSF, I, sig. B3r: “Corpus illud diﬀert a coelesti elemento, quod videlicet φύσιν 
nullam habeat, quae sit separabile a materia sua seu genitali humore. Et ob id Aristo-
teles, ipsum, non coeleste, sed proportione simile coelesti esse dicit, nempe ἀνάλογον 
τῷ ἄνω στοιχείῳ, penetrabile corpus illud est per universam materiam eﬀormans et 
eﬃngens ipsam, naturis partium distinguendo […]. Nam omnino spirituale est cor-
pus illud, cognatissimum substantiae τοῦ πλαστικοῦ λόγου, quem energeian quan-
dam primi actus esse constat, et quasi actum secundum, sed substantialem, animati, 
et physici corporis alterius, ipsum scilicet non physicum corpus existens. Alioqui enim 
corpus physicum, materiam suam subire et penetrare non potest. Penetratio enim 
nulla sit physicorum corporum.”
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idea of the ﬁfth element to the Neoplatonic idea of the “vehicle” 
(ochema) of the soul.36 He also used an argument of cardinal Bes-
sarion (1403/8-1472), who revived this theory in his own interpre-
tation of the famous phrase of Aristotle’s GA, II.3.37 
But whereas Leoniceno had not drawn on Galen’s own words in 
On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, VII.7, Schegk’s position 
is in reality derived directly from Galen’s views expressed there:
And if we must speak of the substance of the soul, we must say one of two things: 
we must say either that it is this, as it were, bright and ethereal (aitherodes) body, 
a view to which the Stoics and Aristotle are carried in spite of themselves, as the 
logical consequence (of their teachings), or that it is (itself ) an incorporeal sub-
stance and this body is its ﬁrst vehicle (ochema), by means of which it establishes 
partnership with other bodies.38
at is why Schegk ﬁnds no problem to place the Stoics and Ari-
stotle in the same position. Citing another passage from Aristotle’s 
GA, II.3—“e faculty of all souls is associated with a body which 
is diﬀerent from the so-called elements and more divine than they 
are; and as the souls diﬀer from one another in the scale of value, 
so too this sort of body diﬀers”39—Schegk adds that, as souls dif-
fer by species from each other, their vehicles also diﬀer by the degree 
of nobility and ignobility. It is true that the Stagirite speaks of a 
36) emistius, Paraphrase on Aristotle’s On the Soul, I.3 (Heinze, 19). On the soul’s 
vehicle, see Eric R. Dodds, Proclus: e Elements of eology (Oxford, 1933/1963), 
315-321; Daniel P. Walker, “e Astral Body in Renaissance Medicine,” Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 21 (1958), 119-133; John F. Finamore, Iamblichus 
and the eory of the Vehicles of the Soul (Chico, 1985); Henry J. Blumenthal, “Soul 
Vehicle in Simplicius,” in Stephen Gersh et al., eds., Platonism in Late Antiquity 
(Indiana, 1992), 173-188; Maria di Pasquale Barbanti, Ochema-Pneuma e phantasia 
nel neoplatonismo: aspetti psicologici e prospettive religiose (Catania, 1998).
37) See Hirai, “Semence, vertu formatrice,” § 3. Cf. Bessarion, In calumniatorem Pla-
tonis (Rome, 1469), III.22, 3 (Ludwig Mohler, Kardinal Bessarion als eologe, Huma-
nist und Staatsmann (Paderborn, 1923-1942), II, 369).
38) Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, VII.7 (Kühn, V, 643 = De Lacy, 474). On 
this treatise in the Renaissance, see Vivian Nutton, “De platicis Hippocratis et Platonis 
in the Renaissance,” in Paola Manuli and Mario Vegetti, eds., Le opere psicologiche di 
Galeno (Naples, 1988), 281-309. 
39) Aristotle, GA, II.3, 736b29-33.
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body which is more divine than the four elements. But, contrary 
to what Schegk wants his readers to believe, he does not mention 
the “spiritual vehicle of the soul.” is is thus a typical example of 
the modus operandi of his interpretation.
Next Schegk compares the power of the vehicle of the plastic 
faculty with the splendour of lights and with the magnetic force of 
loadstones, both of which are, in his eyes, highly penetrating. 
Denying the famous Stoic theory of “total blending,” that is, the 
mutual penetration of physical bodies, he advances that the plastic 
logos, or its divine vehicle, is not physical at all but spiritual.40 It 
is, however, noteworthy that Schegk minimises the inﬂuence of the 
Florentine Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), showing no 
interest in developing the notion of spiritus here, which was so much 
in vogue in this sixteenth century.41 He simply says that such a 
divine body is spiritual and impassive as a logos is. For him, this 
spiritual vehicle can generate, move and establish animate bodies, 
although it is itself neither animate nor merely natural, but is situa-
ted as it were half-way between these two properties.
According to Schegk, Aristotle believes that both the form of the 
soul and the plastic logos are tied by this spiritual vehicle to an orga-
nic body composed of elements. For him, the soul preserves the 
organic body by means of nutrition, which forms the animate body 
from inanimate nutriment. is means that the soul produces ﬂesh 
from what is not ﬂesh and bone from what is not bone. Because 
of this function, the soul resembles to some degree the plastic faculty, 
as it participates in the ethereal vehicle. It is through this divine 
vehicle that the soul also performs other functions like sense-per-
ception and motion. By contrast, the mixtures of elements are 
brought about directly and without the intervention of this spiri-
40) On the theory of the total blending, see Todd, Alexander on Stoic Physics, 29-73.
41) On Ficinian spiritus, see Daniel P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino 
to Campanella (London, 1958); Sylvain Matton, “Marsile Ficin et l’alchimie, sa posi-
tion, son inﬂuence,” in Jean-Claude Margolin and Sylvain Matton, eds., Alchimie et 
philosophie (Paris, 1993), 123-192; Hiro Hirai, “Concepts of Seeds and Nature in the 
Work of Marsilio Ficino,” in Michael J.B. Allen et al., eds., Marsilio Ficino: His e-
ology, His Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden, 2002), 257-284, esp. 273-276; id., “Alter 
Galenus,” 22-28.
book_ESM12-4.indb   394 21-9-2007   9:49:50
 H. Hirai / Early Science and Medicine 12 (2007) 377-404 395
tual vehicle, with the help of the substantial forms that are inca-
pable of producing any animate body.42
Schegk goes in fact even further, arguing that Aristotle calls this 
divine body an “ensouled heat” (thermos empsychos), which is not 
ﬁre nor any such force but possesses a “vivifying faculty” (dunamis 
zotike) like the heat of the sun and that of the residue of animal 
bodies.43 By contrast, what is viviﬁed is composed of elements and 
cannot vivify any other body at all. With this development, Schegk 
naturally associates the phrase from GA, III.11, where Aristotle 
explains spontaneous generation from putreﬁed matter as follows: 
“ere is water in earth, and pneuma in water, and in all pneuma 
is soul-heat, so that in a sense all things are full of soul.”44 Accor-
ding to Schegk, Aristotle wants to express by this “soul-heat” (ther-
motes psychike) the plastic principle which is generated in putreﬁed 
matter and brings about spontaneous generation.
Schegk adds that thanks to its perfect form and analogously to 
celestial bodies, this divine vehicle plays the role of an instrument 
by which the plastic logos can alter and moderate the matter of a 
foetus. As the generative logoi of celestial bodies produce the sub-
stance of natural things by moderating and mixing their matter, this 
divine body, being the instrument of the plastic logos, moderates 
and mixes the matter of the animate body that is to come about. 
us, for example, the plastic logos, which fashions the heart, mode-
rates the matter for the heart through its celestial vehicle. e pla-
stic logos needs this divine vehicle because, without this intermediary 
42) PSF, I, sig. B3r-B3v.
43) e term θερμός ἔμψυχος is not Aristotle’s. Cf. Aristotle, GA, III.1, 751b6; III.4, 
755a20. For a cosmic heat, see Hippocrates, On Flesh, 2 (Littré, VIII, 584); Walter 
Spoerri, “L’anthropogonie du Peri sarkon (et Diodore, I 7, 3 s.),” in François Lasserre 
and Philippe Mudry, eds., Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique (Geneva, 
1983), 57-70; Freudenthal, Aristotle’s eory, 95-97.
44) Aristotle, GA, III.11, 762a18-21. Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, I.5, 411a7-11; On the 
Parts of Animals, I.5, 645a20-23. On the “soul-heat” (θερμότης ψυχική), see Aristo-
tle, GA, II.1, 732a18; II.4, 739a11; III.1, 752a2. See also Jochen Althoﬀ, “Das Konz-
ept der generativen Wärme bei Aristoteles,” Hermes, 120 (1992), 183-193; Gad 
Freudenthal, “e Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle’s Biology: Averroes on the 
Role of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings,” Arabic Sciences and 
Philosophy, 12 (2002), 111-137.
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body, the plastic energeia cannot remain simply incorporeal nor per-
form its power. For Schegk, that is why this vehicle, also called 
“soul-heat” or “divine element,” is by necessity in the service of the 
plastic logos as the instrument of its operations.45
6. e Separability of the Divine Vehicle
Can the divine vehicle be separated from the matter of seed? As we 
have seen, it is with the help of this vehicle that the plastic logos 
generates organic bodies and the soul subsequently informs them. 
Schegk ﬁrst appeals to Aristotle’s Metaphysics which attests, in his 
interpretation, that in the realm of perishable, natural forms, no 
soul except the human one is separable from body. He suggests that 
Aristotle takes non-human souls as non-separable for the reason that 
he cannot admit any energeia without its body. He then turns to a 
passage from GA, II.3, where the Stagirite calls the separated soul 
“intellect,” saying that it comes “from outside.”46 Schegk feels that 
it is natural to connect this to yet another passage in GA, II.3, which 
also speaks of the separated intellect:47 
In the second book On the Generation of Animals, [Aristotle] calls this soul “intel-
lect.” He writes that it comes “from outside,” that is, from without and that it is 
not procreated from the potentiality of matter. He writes in the same book that 
this intellect is received in the matter of seminal liquid and that its vehicle is sepa-
rable from the matter and from the body of sperm, although the vehicle of the 
other [souls] are not separated and that the soul of these [beings] does not exist 
before [this vehicle], because it is generated by the spermatic logos which precedes 
the entelecheia of the soul in generation.48
45) PSF, II, sig. C2r-C2v.
46) Aristotle, GA, II.3, 736b27-29: “It remains, then, that the intellect alone enters 
in, additionally from outside and that it alone is divine; for the bodily actuality is 
nothing to do with its actuality.” Cf. Paul Moraux, “À propos du νοῦς θύραθεν chez 
Aristote,” in Augustin Mansion, ed., Autour d’Aristote (Louvain, 1955), 255-295; 
Preus, “Science and Philosophy,” 32-34.
47) Aristotle, GA, II.3, 737a7-12: “But the body of the semen, in which there also 
comes the portion of the principle of the soul – partly separable from body in all those 
in which something divine is included (and such is what we call the intellect) and 
partly inseparable.” Cf. Verbeke, “Doctrine du pneuma,” 210 n. 12.
48) PSF, I, sig. B4v: “Hanc animam, libro secundo De generatione animalium νοῦς 
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Schegk clearly thinks that, for Aristotle, only the vehicle of the 
human soul is separable, whereas that of the other souls is insepa-
rable, because the souls of inferior living beings are generated by 
the plastic logos which exists before the generation of these souls. 
Concerning the separability of the vehicle of the human soul, Schegk 
notes that Plato expresses the same idea in his Phaedrus, saying that 
the eternal human souls enter from outside into the seminal liquid 
because of the intellect and that they are neither generated nor cor-
rupted at the same time with their body. However, Schegk does not 
want to touch the issue of metempsychosis, that is, the transmigra-
tion of the soul, which he considers a mere fable.49
Emphasising his Christian position, Schegk maintains that God 
alone is the Creator of human souls. And he sums up the opinion 
of the ancient philosophers as follows: Only the vehicle of the 
human soul is separable from seminal liquid, thanks to the intel-
lect. e plastic power, given to the spermatic logos, achieves gene-
ration with the help of this spiritual vehicle as its instrument. e 
organic body is formed by this vehicle, which is not the intellect 
but the divine body, and the soul informs the developed parts of 
the organic body. anks to this vehicle, the human soul enters the 
body at birth and leaves it at death. at is why, says Schegk, the 
human soul is called “divine breath” (spiraculum divinum) in Gene-
sis and “man-god” (anthropodaimona) by Euripides. He concludes 
that, for the ancient philosophers, the human soul alone is sepa-
appellat, quem θύραθεν, id est, extrinsecus advenire, et non de potentia materiae pro-
creari scribit. Idem libro eodem, ipsum νοῦς, in materia τῆς γονῆς recipi scribit, et -
ὄχημα ipsius a materia, et corpore spermatis esse separabile, cum aliarum ὄχημα, non 
sit χωριστόν et prius horum anima non sit ; quia generetur λόγῳ σπερματικῷ, qui 
γενέσει praecedat ἐντελέχειαν animae.”
49) Plato does not say as such but this is again Schegk’s reinterpretation. Cf. Plato, 
Phaedrus, 246C. On “metempsychosis” in the Renaissance, see Hirai, “Alter Galenus,” 
15; François Secret, “Alchimie, palingénésie et métempsychose chez Guillaume Pos-
tel,” Chrysopœia, 3 (1989), 3-60, esp. 54-55; Jean-Pierre Brach, Guillaume Postel: Des 
admirables secrets des nombres platoniciens (Paris, 2001), 179-209; Helmut Zander, Ge -
schichte der Seelenwanderung in Europa: Alternative religiöse Traditionen von der Antike 
bis heute (Darmstadt, 1999), 233-247.
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rable from the body whereas the other souls are inseparable.50 What 
is important for us to remark here is the fact that it is by the pla-
stic logos with the help of its divine vehicle that all the non-human 
souls are procreated.
7. Is the Plastic logos a Part of the Soul?
Schegk then turns to a discussion of whether the plastic logos beco-
mes a part of the soul, which is to be generated, and whether, by 
a total dissolution, none of its parts remains in the established orga-
nic body. He ﬁrst reminds us that Aristotle proves the dissolution 
of the plastic logos by the example of a coagulant which perishes 
and disappears after the coagulation of milk.51 For him, when the 
soul enters the organic body in order to animate it, the plastic logos, 
disappearing by itself, is replaced by the soul. He gives as proof ano-
ther passage of Aristotle’s GA, II.1: “Now the seed, and the move-
ment and principle which it contains, are such that, as the movement 
ceases, each part gets formed and acquires the soul.”52 Schegk con-
tinues:
For, the spermatic logos cannot remain in the same subject where the soul resides. 
Indeed, the plastic logos is in matter from which, thanks to its power, the organic 
body is generated whereas the soul remains, as entelecheia, in the organic body 
already established and, once the movement of generation ceases, the plastic logos 
itself ceases to exist.53
50) PSF, I, sig. B4v-B5r. See Genesis, II.7, on the spiraculum vitae of God and Eurip-
ides, Rhesos, 971, on the anthropodaimon (ἀνθρωποδαίμων).
51) Cf. Aristotle, GA, II.3, 737a13-16: “erefore we ought not to expect it always to 
come out again from the female or to form any part of the embryo that has taken 
shape from it; the case resembles that of the ﬁg-juice which curdles milk, for this too 
changes without becoming any part of the curdled bulk.”
52) Aristotle, GA, II.1, 734b21-24.
53) PSF, I, sig. B4r: “In quo subjecto enim inest anima, in eodem λόγος σμερματικός 
inesse nequit. Nam πλαστικός λόγος in materia est, ex qua, causa δυνάμεως, gener-
atur organicum corpus, sed anima est, ut ἐντελέχεια, in perfecto jam organico cor-
pore, et desinente motu generationis ipse etiam λόγος πλαστικός desinit esse.”
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According to Schegk, Aristotle shows that the subject of sperm is 
an airy spiritus and a foam-like moisture both of which dissolve 
after the generation of the organic body. When they are dissolved, 
the plastic logos disappears at the same time. is means that the 
instrumental cause is replaced by the formal cause, the soul, which 
remains in the divine vehicle as its “inhabitant.” anks to this 
vehicle, which is analogous to the celestial element, the plastic logos 
cannot only generate the organic body but also the soul, which fol-
lows it, can vivify and preserve this body. To Schegk, after the exe-
cution of its work, the instrument must leave the achieved product 
and cannot stay in it as its part any more. e soul replaces the 
plastic logos in this way. Schegk adds, however, that besides the 
human soul, nothing is separable from the organic body in living 
beings, because both the plastic logos and the divine vehicle, and 
consequently the non-human soul attached to the latter, are not 
separable from the elemental body. e case of humans is, howe-
ver, diﬀerent:
In the generation of man, the plastic logos as its instrumental cause is indeed inse-
parable whereas the human soul—given that it is not drawn from the potentia-
lity of matter by the plastic logos but is introduced into the matter thanks to the 
intellect’s divine and immortal essence, which may be only created but not gene-
rated—will be something created together with this divine body. With this 
[body], it will be introduced together with the plastic logos into seminal liquid, so 
that it resides as a certain morphe in the organic body formed by the plastic 
faculty. e eidos of the human soul was not eternal, as it seems to Plato and Ari-
stotle, but was created by God; this eidos might be, however, separated from the 
body, and, unlike the other natural forms, might never be generated or corrupted 
by accident.54
54) PSF, I, sig. B5v: “In generatione autem hominis πλαστικός quidem λόγος, ut 
instrumentalis causa inseparabilis est, anima autem humana quum τῷ πλαστικῷ λόγῳ 
non educatur de potentia materiae, sed introducatur in eam propter divinam et 
immortalem et non nisi creabilem, non autem generabilem mentis essentiam, cum 
divino corpore illo concreatum quiddam erit, et cum illo, una cum πλαστικῷ λόγῳ 
in genitali humore includetur, ut plastica facultate formato corpori organico, 
tanquam μορφή quaedam insit, ita tamen ut animae humanae εἶδος non sempiter-
num fuerit, ut Platoni, et Aristoteli videtur, sed a Deo creatum εἶδος, quod a corpore 
tamen χωρίστον sit, et ut aliae formae naturales, nequaquam generabile per accidens 
aut corruptibile εἶδος existat.” Aristotle seems to have used the terms eidos and mor-
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According to Schegk, ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle 
think that the human soul exists before it is introduced from out-
side into the human body to animate this organic body. at is why 
it is ﬁrst called “species” (eidos) in the seed and then “form” (mor-
phe) in the organic body. e human soul is separated and sepa-
rable from the human body in these two phases. Schegk adds that 
the divine vehicle is “consubstantial” with this soul. anks to this 
spiritual vehicle, the human soul can enter and leave the human 
body. en Schegk makes clear the diﬀerence between the eidos and 
the morphe under the authority of Aristotle. e former means a 
“species which exists by itself,” whereas the latter signiﬁes a “spe-
cies which animates matter.” us the human soul is an eidos sepa-
rated from the organic body before the ensoulment but is a separable 
morphe when it resides in this human body. As for the other ani-
mate beings, their soul is only drawn from the potentiality of mat-
ter by the plastic faculty and nothing is separable because their eidos 
does not pre-exist and their morphe is not separable even partially.55 
Although Schegk’s discussion principally concerns here the soul, it 
should be understood that the plastic logos is always inseparable from 
the divine vehicle for all living beings including man.
Schegk then invokes the Bible, which he claims also teaches the 
following points: 1) e human soul enters the organic body thanks 
to the seed coming from the father; 2) the body is not formed 
before the soul is created by God; 3) the soul is introduced from 
outside into this body by the plastic faculty. In Schegk’s eyes, even 
if the ancient philosophers postulated the pre-existence of the non-
created human soul, the doctrine of creation must be defended by 
Christian philosophers. For this reason, it is to be aﬃrmed that the 
human soul did not receive its essence from the plastic logos but 
from the Creator God, who possesses in him all the souls and natu-
res of things.56
phe as synonyms, although the latter bears overtones relating to external, visible and 
concrete aspects. On these terms, see especially André Motte et al., eds., Philosophie 
de la forme: eidos, idea, morphè dans la philosophie grecque des origines à Aristote (Lou-
vain-la-Neuve, 2003).
55) PSF, I, sig. B5v-B6r.
56) PSF, I, sig. B6r-B6v.
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Before closing his discussion, Schegk enumerates four possible 
opinions on the origin of human souls: 1) ey are eternal and 
enter bodies at birth and leave them at death (according to Plato 
and Aristotle); 2) they are created all at once in the beginning of 
the world, but each of them enters its speciﬁc body at a precise 
moment; 3) they are drawn from the potentiality of matter by the 
plastic logos as the products of Nature; 4) each of them begins to 
exist by divine creation at the same moment when body is formed 
by the plastic logos. Schegk obviously chooses the last option, denying 
that the human soul is drawn from the potentiality of matter. Invo-
king the authority of the Bible, he concludes that God forms crea-
tures by the plastic instrument of the seed’s nature, whereas only 
for man God simultaneously creates his soul by Himself and forms 
his organic body by means of this plastic nature. According to 
Schegk, God is the Creator of angels whereas the human soul, which 
shares the angelic essence, is created as the “breath” (spiraculum) of 
the Creator and is not “produced” by the plastic nature. e eve-
ryday creation of the human soul with the formation of its orga-
nic body, which is to be animated by this soul, is the ultimate action 
of the Creator. Although God attributed a primary generative task 
to the plastic nature, he does not cease to create human souls in 
order to show that man is not the “product” (plasma) of Nature but 
the son of God. Schegk concludes:
I believe that, if the philosophers had known the Creator God, they would have 
agreed with us and would have said that the souls are not contained in the seed 
and in the seminal liquid of the male before they inform human bodies. In fact, 
denying the Creator God, or rather being ignorant of Him, they were forced to 
conclude that, by the spermatic logos, the human soul and its body are generated 
at the same time and that the human soul is not introduced from outside but is 
drawn from the potentiality of matter.57
57) PSF, I, sig. B7r: “Credo philosophos, si agnovissent Deum creatorem, nobiscum 
consensuros, et non prius animas, quam informent corpora humana, in semine ac 
genitali humore masculini sexus contineri dixissent. Nam creatorem Deum negantes, 
aut potius nescientes, cogerentur certe fateri : τῷ σμερματικῷ λόγῳ simul animam 
humanam, et corpus ipsi nasci, et non θύραθεν introduci, sed educi animam huma-
nam de potentia materiae.”
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For Schegk, the plastic nature produces all except the human soul, 
which, endowed with angelic essence, has only the Creator God as 
its maker. e human soul, or more precisely, the intellect cannot 
be generated through seminal propagation since it is something “born 
before” (progenes) Nature. It should be created by what precedes it. 
at is the Creator God.
8. Conclusions
We have in the present article traced the major lines of Schegk’s 
theory of the plastic faculty. For him, this faculty, also called “sper-
matic logos,” is the synonym of the sperm, which is not conceived 
as visible and material seminal liquid but as a certain dunamis and 
logos, created by God. It is the instrumental eﬃcient cause of the 
generation of organic bodies, whereas the principal eﬃcient cause 
is the parent or heaven. It works, so to speak, as the instrument of 
the Creator God. It stands in the middle realm between the cor-
poreal and the incorporeal as well as between the material and the 
immaterial. It is the secondary actuality, that is, the energeia of the 
essence of the parent’s soul. is plastic secondary actuality is sub-
stantial because it can generate in matter a substance, that is, the 
soul. When the soul enters the body formed by the plastic faculty, 
this faculty is replaced by the soul, which then informs and ani-
mates the established organic body, and being replaced by the soul, 
this faculty disappears. In the Aristotelian tradition, the generative 
faculty was attributed to the vegetative soul, but this type of soul 
is almost absent in Schegk’s discussion.58 Instead, the plastic logos 
produces the non-human souls and precedes them. Although he 
always relies upon Aristotle’s words, Schegk often interprets them 
58) On the vegetative soul, see Aristotle, On the Soul, II.4, 415a14-416b31. Cf. Wil-
liam D. Ross, Aristote (Paris, 1930), 145-146. For Galien, see Moraux, “Galien comme 
philosophe,” 93-94; Phillip De Lacy, “e ird Part of the Soul,” in Le opere psico-
logiche, 43-63. For the early modern period, see Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form: Late 
Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca, 2000), 133-138; Guido Giglioni, “Between 
Sleep and Waking: e Vegetative Soul, the Aristotelian Notion of Life, and Early 
Modern Philosophy,” forthcoming.
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in a unique way and moves away dramatically from the master’s 
thought.
e plastic faculty is always accompanied by a certain divine and 
ethereal body which is also the vehicle of the soul. is interme-
diary and spiritual vehicle corresponds by analogy to the celestial 
element, the aether. Schegk develops a particular interpretation of 
the Neoplatonic theory of the “vehicle of the soul” (ochema-pneuma) 
from an Aristotelian perspective. is divine vehicle is also called 
“ensouled heat,” “soul-heat” or “divine element.” According to 
Schegk, the ancient philosophers explained that, by means of this 
spiritual body, the human soul enters the organic body at birth and 
leaves it at death. But favouring the Christian point of view, he 
defends the continuous creation of the human soul by God. For 
him, the human soul is created by God at the same moment when 
its organic body is formed by the plastic faculty.59 A religious tone 
can thus be found to colour his philosophical discourse. In this 
extraordinary embryological theory, we may observe a radical chal-
lenge formulated by a Protestant physician at the height of Renais-
sance medical humanism. 
It is however only after Schegk’s On the Plastic Faculty of Seed, 
towards the end of the sixteenth century, that the term “plastic force” 
(vis plastica) really became popular in embryological speculations. 
Although the publication of his treatise itself came relatively late, 
Schegk might have formulated his ideas in his lectures at Tübingen 
before its publication. ey could have then be disseminated from 
the lecture room, particularly in reformed lands, since his lectures 
attracted many Protestant students, including the famous French 
Paraclesian Joseph Duchesne alias Quercetanus (1546-1609), who 
59) Sennert, another Lutheran, rejected however the idea on the continuous creation 
of human souls. See Michel Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul: e Medical and Lutheran 
Context of Daniel Sennert’s Atomism,” Medicina nei secoli, 15 (2003), 177-203; Hiro 
Hirai, “Atomes vivants, origine de l’âme et génération spontanée chez Daniel Sennert 
(et Fortunio Liceti),” Bruniana & Campanelliana, 13 (2007), forthcoming. Does 
Schegk see in the plastic faculty as divine instrument the manifestation of the Word 
of God? At any event, Oswald Croll developed such a view. See my next study, “e 
Word of God and Universal Medicine in the Paracelsian Chemical Philosophy of 
Oswald Croll,” forthcoming.
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admired Schegk as his “second father.”60 At any event, the idea of 
the plastic force was to be discussed intensely in the course of the 
seventeenth century by such major ﬁgures as Kircher, More, Cud-
worth or Leibniz. But the problem of its diﬀusion largely exceeds 
the frame of the present discussion. It is a subject to be fully treated 
in another study.
60) See Pagel, New Light on Harvey, 56. On Duchesne, see Hiro Hirai, “Paracelsisme, 
néoplatonisme et médecine hermétique dans la théorie de la matière de Joseph Du 
Chesne à travers son Ad veritatem hermeticae medicinae (1604),” Archives internation-
ales d’histoire des sciences, 51 (2001), 9-37; Didier Kahn, “L’interprétation alchimique 
de la Genèse chez Joseph Du Chesne dans le contexte de ses doctrines alchimiques et 
cosmologiques,” in Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, ed., Scientiae et artes: Die Vermittlung 
alten und neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst und Musik (Wiesbaden, 2004), 641-692.
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